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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. NELSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PERRY A. PETERSON, M.D., et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 13803 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
dba VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a malpractice suit by plaintiff, wherein 
she claims that negligence upon the part of defendant 
doctor and defendant hospital caused a stillbirth of her 
baby. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of both defen-
dants against the plaintiff no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in plaintiff's 
brief is not complete and ignores the time-honored rule 
that on appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict, the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, in this case the defendants. We, therefore, deem 
it necessary to restate the facts. 
Plaintiff was a maternity patient of defendant 
Dr. Peterson. Her pregnancy proceeded essentially un-
eventfully until September 2, 1971. On this date she was 
overdue for delivery, and was examined by Dr. Peterson in 
his office. He performed both an external and internal 
examination and advised her that she was ready for deliv-
ery, and that she should proceed promptly to the hospital 
where labor would be induced. (R. 338) Dr. Peterson also 
called the defendant hospital and gave instructions to 
prepare the plaintiff for induction. (R. 247, 324, 404) 
Plaintiff left Dr. Peterson's office in downtown 
Salt Lake at about 4:00 p.m. There was a dispute in the 
evidence as to whether she proceeded directly to the defen 
dant hospital or whether she stopped at her home for some 
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personal supplies before going to the hospital. (R. 339-
340, 392, 394) In any event, she arrived at the hospital 
at 4:42 p.m. (Ex. 1) She was not at this time in active 
labor. (R. 341, 352, 356-357, 364) Since she had been 
in the hospital a couple of days earlier in false labor, 
it was not necessary that she be nprepped,ff but she was 
given all of the other routine treatment on admission, 
including an external examination by the nurse (vital 
signs), an enema was administered, and fetal heart tones 
were heard and found to be normal. (R. 340, 364, 396, 
Ex. 1) 
At the time of her arrival at the hospital, 
there was a complicated delivery taking place in the de-
livery room, and the O.B. nurse was primarily occupied 
with that. (R. 364, 408-409, 422-423) Plaintiff was 
accompanied by her sister, Jeanette Rex (R. 352, 368), and 
she had available at her bedside a call button. (R. 407) 
At no time did she make any complaint of pain or discom-
fort, nor did she seek the assistance of any hospital per-
sonnel. (R. 328, 341, 352, 356-357, 363, 406, 429-430) 
The delivery which was in progress in the deliv-
ery room was completed around 6:30 p.m., and the nurses 
then started to prepare the infusion pump for induction of 
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labor. (R. 341, 365) Some difficulty was encountered 
with the equipment, and eventually one of the nurses 
called the head O.B. nurse for advice as to the problem. 
At about this time, Dr. Peterson arrived, and either he or 
Nurse Rhoads got the machine operating properly. (R. 344, 
366, 413) Dr. Peterson then made a vaginal examination 
and discovered that there was a prolapsed cord, and he was 
unable to hear any fetal heart tones and concluded that 
the baby had died. (R. 344-345) The baby was ultimately 
stillborn at about 8:31 p.m. (Ex. 1) 
The only evidence offered by the plaintiff of 
any negligence upon the part of defendant hospital was the 
testimony of Dr. Harris. Dr. Harris testified that he had 
never practiced at Valley West Hospital and was not famil-
iar with its staff or its capabilities. (R. 293) However, 
he stated that the standard of care in Salt Lake hospitals 
would be for a newly-admitted maternity patient to have 
both an abdominal and vaginal examination and to listen 
for fetal heart tones. (R. 295) The purpose of the vag-
inal examination would be to determine the status of the 
cervix, the condition of the membranes and any protruding 
parts which could be palpated. (R. 295) 
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On cross-examination he admitted that the stan-
dard operating procedures are determined by the hospital 
staff members of the specialty involved. (R. 307) He 
admitted that an external examination was done in this case 
and that fetal heart tones were heard and were within nor-
mal range. (R. 308, 310) The only thing not done at the 
time of admission was a vaginal examination. If the 
patient came directly to the hospital from the doctor's 
office (as was the case here), there would be no need for 
a vaginal examination. (R. 308) 
Even if a vaginal examination had been performed, 
there was no assurance that the nurse would have discovered 
that the amniotic membrane had ruptured. This is sometimes 
a difficult determination even for a doctor. (R. 309) 
There could be pressure on the cord from the baby's head, 
even before prolapse, and this could not be discovered by 
a vaginal examination. (R. 311) He further admitted that 
even if the prolapse of the cord occurred before plain-
tiff's arrival at the hospital, and if it could have been 
discovered upon vaginal examination at the time of admis-
sion, it was speculative whether the baby could have been 
saved. (R. 312-313) 
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Thus, according to the testimony of plaintiff's 
own expert, the only thing omitted by the hospital which 
is usually done at the time of admission was a vaginal 
examination, and in view of the fact that plaintiff had 
just left her doctor's office, that was not indicated. 
Even if it had been performed, it was speculative as to 
whether the outcome would have been any different. (R. 312 
and 313) As left on cross-examination, Dr. Harris' tes-
timony did not make a prima facie case of negligence, and 
left to speculation whether anything the hospital might 
have done could have affected the ultimate outcome. 
Defendant Dr. Peterson testified that whether a 
vaginal examination should be done upon admission to the 
hospital, in the absence of instructions from the doctor, 
depends upon the judgment of the nurses. (R. 245, 276) 
In some cases the doctor may request it. In this instance, 
Dr. Peterson gave no such instructions and there was no 
reason to do so. (R. 245-246) When Dr. Peterson called 
the hospital to arrange for plaintiff's admission, he 
advised that the bag of waters was bulging, but had not 
yet ruptured, and that plaintiff was not in labor. 
(R. 274) He also testified, in harmony with Dr. Harris, 
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that the purpose of a vaginal examination is to determine 
the status of the cervix, and that sometimes it is dif-
ficult even for doctors to determine whether the amniotic 
membrane has ruptured, A nurse might not make that deter-
mination even if she performed a vaginal examination, 
(FL 275) 
Dr. Peterson had no opinion as to when the pro-
lapse of the cord occurred. It could have occurred at any 
time from the time the patient left his office until the 
time he saw her at the hospital approximately three hours 
laterc (R. 277) There is no assurance that an examination 
would have discovered the prolapse of the cord. Death of 
the baby could have occurred before the prolapse. It could 
have occurred before the time that the most skilled doctor 
could have discovered the prolapse. If the prolapse had 
been discovered, the doctor should have been notified. In 
this instance, he could not have taken effective action in 
much less than an hour. In this time the baby could have 
expired. (R. 277-278) 
He also testified that the hospital had performed 
all of his routine orders up to the time of the birth. 
(R. 280, 396) Had he desired further activity on the part 
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of hospital personnel, he would have called the hospital 
and directed it. (R. 396) Since the patient had just * 
come from the doctor!s office to the hospital and since I 
she was not in active labor and was waiting for induction, . 
the nurses had no occasion to examine her. (R. 396, 397) 
In summary, there was substantial evidence sup- ] 
porting the juryfs finding that defendant hospital had « 
conformed to the standard of care of hospitals in this com-
munity, and there was no competent evidence from which a I 
jury could find that, even if there had been a departure i 
from the standard of care, that such probably caused the 
death of plaintiff's unborn baby. | 
At the outset of the trial, plaintiff's attorney | 
made a motion in limine which was granted in part, and 
counsel for the defendants were ordered not to refer to I 
the illegitimacy of the pregnancy or to the fact that 1 
plaintiff was on welfare. (R. 200-206) However, by in-
advertence during the cross-examination of Dr. Peterson, I 
he volunteered both that the plaintiff was on welfare and I 
that the pregnancy was illegitimate. (R. 268) Plaintiff's 
counsel immediately made a motion for mistrial, which was * 
extensively argued to the court. The court denied the I 
i 
i 
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motion for mistrial and concluded that he had erred in 
ruling on the motion in limine, and that it was proper to 
prove the illegitimacy of the pregnancy and plaintiff's 
status as a welfare patient, which were relevant on the 
issue of damages. (Rc 268-273) 
Both defendants made motions for directed verdict 
at the end of plaintiff's case (R. 372-390) and again at 
the conclusion of all of the evidence. (R. 437-438) These 
motions were taken under advisement. (R. 438) The case 
was submitted to a jury, which returned with an unanimous 
defense verdict for both defendants. (R. 18, 456) A sub-
sequent motion for new trial was denied, (R. 9-10, 15-16) 
and this appeal followed. (R. 5-7) 
, ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A 
PLAINTIFF'S VERDICT. 
Without so much as a single citation of authority, 
and based solely upon a review of the record in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, her attorneys contend that 
the verdict in this case is unsupported by the weight of 
the evidence. Plaintiff argues: 
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• 
1. That defendant hospital should have performed , 
an abdominal and vaginal examination upon plaintiff's 
admission to the hospital. 
Answer: The hospital did perform an abdominal i 
examination. (R. 308, 310, 340, 364, 396, Ex. 1) While 
Dr0 Harris testified that it was the standard of care in J 
this community to perform a vaginal examination upon admis- i 
sion, he admitted on cross-examination that such was not 
necessary in this case, since the plaintiff had had a vag- | 
inal examination at her doctor's office immediately before 1 
her admission to the hospital. (R. 308) Dr. Peterson tes-
tified that in the absence of directions from the attending I 
physician, it was a matter of judgment upon the part of the I 
nurses as to whether a vaginal examination should be done 
upon admission to the hospital, and that under the facts I 
of this case, a vaginal examination was not indicated. 1 
(R. 245-246, 276, 396, 397) 
2. The standard of care requires an abdominal • 
and vaginal examination prior to induction of labor. I 
Answer: Labor was not induced until Dr. Peterson 
arrived at the hospital. Although the nurses had been work-
ing with the infusion pump prior to his arrival, they had 1 
i 
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not been successful in getting it to operate. (R. 344-345, 
366, 413) Plaintiff was receiving only glucose solution 
and no medication from the equipment prior to the time of 
Dr. Peterson's arrival. (R. 411-412) Dr. Peterson per-
formed a vaginal examination immediately after the equip-
ment started to operate. (R. 344-345) Plaintiff's expert, 
Dr. Harris, agreed that this would satisfy the standard of 
care of the community. (R. 311-312) 
3. The standard of care requires hospital per-
sonnel to inquire of the patient upon admission whether 
her water has broken. 
Answer: It is speculative at best as to whether 
such an inquiry would have elicited any reliable informa-
tion. At the trial, plaintiff testified that she did not 
know when her bag of waters broke. (R. 367) At the time 
of the incident, she told Dr. Peterson that she experienced 
a gush of fluid from the vagina while she was at home, 
between her examination by Dr. Peterson and her admission 
to the hospital. (R. 392, 394, 427, Ex. 1) However, at 
# 
trial, plaintiff denied that she went home between the time 
she left Dr. Peterson's office and the time she arrived at 
the hospital. (R. 339-340) 
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The problem of causation is even more tenuous. 
Dr. Harris admitted on cross-examination that it was spec-
ulative (1) whether the cord had prolapsed at the time of 
plaintiff's admission to the hospital (R. 309); (2) whether 
it would have been discovered by a vaginal examination by 
a nurse even if it had prolapsed (R. 309); and (3) whether, 
under the circumstances, the baby could have been saved 
even if a prolapsed cord had been discovered upon admission 
to the hospital. (R. 312-313) The testimony of a witness 
is no stronger than it is left on cross-examination. 
Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021. 
While our research has discovered no cases 
closely similar in point of fact, we believe that the 
cases discussed below^establish the applicable law: 
In Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021, 
a young mother died following childbirth. The court held 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable 
in an obstetric case. The court likewise held that a 
verdict could not be based on conjecture or speculation. 
Said the court: 
ff
. . . A verdict of a jury may not be 
based on such conjectures. Peterson v. 
Richards, 73 Utah 57, 272 P. 229; Baxter 
v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257. 
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f,In order to recover in such case the 
plaintiff must show that in treatment of the 
patient the defendant physician did not 
exercise such care and diligence as is or-
dinarily exercised by skilled physicians 
doing the same type of work in the vicinity, 
and that the want or failure of the required 
skill and care was the cause of the injury 
complained of. That there might have been 
neglect or lack of skill is not enough. To 
permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony 
showing only possibility, or what might or 
could have happened, is to permit a jury to 
base a verdict upon conjecture, speculation 
or suspicion." (Emphasis added.) 
In Moore v. D. & R.G.W. Railroad Company, 4 Utah 
2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, plaintiff's doctor testified that it 
was "possible" that plaintiff had a herniated disc. This 
court held that the trial court committed error in refus-
ing to take from the consideration of the jury the issue 
of whether plaintiff had a herniated intervertebral disc. 
This court held that under that evidence the existence of 
a herniated disc was at best speculative and a verdict 
could not be based upon such evidence, and the verdict and 
judgment were reversed. 
To the same effect see Jackson v. Colston, 116 
Utah 295, 209 P02d 566. 
In the case of Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935, this court 
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affirmed a defense verdict and judgment in a suit against i 
a hospital, saying: 
"What the parties are entitled to and j 
the law seeks to afford is an opportunity 
for one claiming a grievance which would | 
justify legal redress to present it to a | 
court or jury and to have a fair trial. 
When this is done, and the verdict and j 
judgment are entered, all presumptions are I 
in favor of their validity. The burden is 
upon the appellant not only to show that 1 
there was error, but that it was prejudi- I 
cial to the extent that there is reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would | 
have been a different result. We find no I 
such error here.11 
That language is fully applicable here. 1 
At the top of page 5 of plaintiff's brief, it is 1 
argued "that the hospital and/or doctor breached the stan-
dard of care in the community . . .M This is a claim • 
which smacks of res ipsa loquitur. A similar argument was ] 
rejected in the case of Talbot v. W. H. Groves1 Latter-Day 
Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872. This court specif- • 
ically rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as I 
against a hospital and two doctors, where plaintiff failed 
to show which of the defendants was in charge of the offend-
ing instrumentality, or the management of the case, at the I 
time plaintiff's injury occurred. In Denny v. St. Markfs . 
Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944, this court held 
i 
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that there was no competent evidence to support a finding 
that plaintiff was injured as a result of manipulation of 
her body while X-rays were being taken, and affirmed a 
directed verdict for the defendant. 
Not only is the jury's verdict adequately sup-
ported by the evidence, but in fact there is no competent 
evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff. The respective motions of the defendants for 
directed verdict should have been granted, and the judg-
ment below should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING TESTIMONY 
AS TO THE PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY OF 
PLAINTIFF'S STILLBORN CHILD. 
Again, without any citation of authority, plain-
tiff urges that the court erred in permitting evidence 
concerning the identity of the father of the stillborn 
child, and of the child's illegitimacy. As noted in our 
Statement of Facts, the court at the outset of the trial 
granted plaintiff's motion in limine, prohibiting defense 
counsel from inquiring into the paternity and legitimacy 
of the baby. By inadvertence, the fact of the baby's 
illegitimacy came out in an answer by Dr. Peterson to a 
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question propounded by counsel for the hospital. Plain-
tiff's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, and at 
this point the matter was re-argued. The judge then be-
came convinced that, in view of plaintiff's claims for 
mental anguish arising out of the stillbirth, all of the 
facts surrounding the pregnancy became relevant and mate-
rial and that, in fact, defendants would have been unfairly 
prejudiced if such evidence had been suppressed. 
Under Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, the trial 
judge is vested with a wide discretion in weighing the rel-
evance of evidence as against any collateral prejudicial 
or distracting effect that it may have. In the absence of 
a showing of abuse of that discretion, such rulings cannot 
be held to be erroneous. 
Here the court clearly weighed the conflicting 
considerations, and concluded that, on balance, the proba-
tive value of the evidence outweighed any inflammatory or 
other improper effect that it might have. The ruling was 
a considered one, after extensive argument to the court 
both at the outset of trial and again on the motion for 
mistrial. Plaintiff has advanced neither facts nor legal 
authority which would support a holding that the judge 
-17-
abused his discretion or committed error in receiving the 
questioned evidence. 
POINT III 
THIS STATE DOES NOT RECOGNIZE AN ACTION FOR 
THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF AN UNBORN CHILD. 
We do not believe that the court will reach 
Point III. If defendants' position under Points I and II 
is sustained, Point III becomes moot. 
We recognize that in recent years a line of 
authority has developed supporting the principle that an 
unborn but viable fetus is a legal person, and that legal 
action may be maintained either by it for prenatal injuries 
or by its parents for prenatal death. However, these hold-
ings are not the tidal flood which they are painted to be 
by plaintiff's counsel. 
Many respected courts of last resort continue to 
adhere to the traditional rule, that an unborn child is 
not a legal person, and that no action will lie for its 
wrongful death. California and New York, two of the most 
liberal jurisdictions in the country, continue to adhere 
to this principle. Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 
100 Cal. Rptr. 212; Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 
301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901. The highly respected 
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Supretne Judicial Court of Massachusetts also adheres to 
this view. Leccese v. McDonough, (Mass.) 279 N.E.2d 339. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Gay v. 
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425, placed its decision 
on the highly practical ground that there can be no ev-
idence from which to infer a pecuniary injury resulting 
from the wrongful prenatal death of a viable fetus. Said 
the court: 
11
 . . . We have based our decision on the 
ground there can be no evidence from which to 
infer 'pecuniary injury resulting from1 the 
wrongful prenatal death of a viable child en 
ventre sa mere; it is all sheer speculation. 
Consequently, it is not necessary for us to 
decide in this case the debatable question as 
to whether a viable child en ventre sa mere, 
who is born dead, is a person within the mean-
ing of our wrongful death act. See Graf v 
Taggert, supra, at p.143 of 204 A2d 140." 
( Emphasis added.) 
Other cases wherein recovery has been denied are: 
Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Fla.), 213 
So.2d 695; McKillip v. Zimmerman, (Iowa), 191 N.W.2d 706; 
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, (111. App.) 279 N.E.2d 440; 
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229; 
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140; Padillow v. 
Elrod (Okla.), 424 P.2d 16; Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 
614, 371 S.W.2d 433; and Lawrence v. Craven Tire Company, 
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210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440. Analogous to these cases is 
State v, Dickinson (Ohio), 263 N.E.2d 253, holding that a 
viable unborn fetus is not a person within the meaning of 
the automobile homicide statute. 
Although the case of Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 
132 P.2d 114, is not strictly in point since it does not 
involve a viable fetus, the language of this court in that 
case appears to be pertinent: 
11
 . . . While injuries resulting in a 
miscarriage are actionable, and compensation 
may be awarded for the physical and mental 
sufferings experienced by a woman who has a 
miscarriage by reason of injuries caused by 
the wrongful acts of others, damages are not 
awarded for 'loss of the unborn child1 
itself." 
We respectfully suggest that that language would be equally 
appropriate to the facts of this case, and that this court 
would remain in good judicial company by adhering to the 
traditional rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff had a full and fair trial upon the 
merits of her case which was determined by a jury. All 
presumptions are now in favor of the validity of the pro-
ceedings below. Plaintiff has demonstrated no error and 
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indeed has failed to establish even a prima facie case. 
She received all that she was entitled to and more in the 
trial court. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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